The Exclusionary Rule:  An Ill Conceived and Ineffective Remedy by McGarr, Frank J.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 52
Issue 3 September-October Article 4
Fall 1961
The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill Conceived and
Ineffective Remedy
Frank J. McGarr
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Frank J. McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 266
(1961)
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: AN ILL CONCEIVED AND INEFFECTIVE REMEDY
FRANK J. McGARR
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I am very impressed by the presentation of
Professor Paulsen who, with very commendable
objectivity, presented my side of the story as
ably as he did his own. In a sense, he stole my
thunder because I think he did an excellent job
of indicating the arguments against the exclu-
sionary rule as well as those for it.
In arguing against this rule, I realize that I take
a somewhat lonely position. After forty or fifty
years of its general acceptance as part of the body
of American law and with the lip service that is
almost habitually done it, it is hard to find people
who are willing to stand against the rule. I am
willing to do so, perhaps, because in my experience
as a prosecutor I frequently saw guilty persons
released to prey again upon sooiety because of
the operation of the rule, and I could not help but
be disturbed by the experience. And I think, too,
that most of us will recognize that there is a very
nasty situation involving the exclusionary rule
whereby corrupt law enforcement agents will make
deliberate illegal searches for the express purpose,
in cooperation with criminals, of forever tainting
and rendering inadmissible the evidence they seize.
These two circumstances give me the courage to
stand against the world as far as the exclusionary
rule is concerned. I have one more circumstance
and that is my delight that Dean Wigmore takes
my side. Where better than at Northwestern
could I cite such hallowed authority for my posi-
tion as Dean Wigrore.
By way of background for what I think is the
approach that must be taken to the exclusionary
rule, I'd like to observe that one of the major
problems currently besetting our society is the
rising incidence of crime. Now, we are not facing
up to this problem today because it is not so
intriguing and emotionally charged as integration
or the missile lag or something of this sort, but
it is a very real problem. Without spending a lot
of time on statistics or statistical argument, it
could be demonstrated, if I devoted the time to it,
that in the years since the war the incidence of
crime has steadily increased in the United States
at a rate more rapid than the increase in population
and that, in the categories of crimes committed,
there has been a gradual but perceptible shift
from the less serious to the more serious offenses.
Another equally disturbing fact, which I cannot
statistically support but which I base on personal
observation in the field, is that there is an in-
creasing success enjoyed by defense counsel with,
of course, the cooperation of the courts, and par-
ticularly the United States Supreme Court, in
hiding their clients from justice and retribution
in the nooks and crannies of Constitutional law,
leaving them free to return to their antisocial
careers. I don't pretend to be able to analyze all
the causes for what I regard as this fairly sad
state of affairs, but it is my thesis that one of
these causes, to a greater or lesser degree, is the
exclusionary rule.
With this in mind, I would like to take a fresh
look at this rule, to try to strip away from it forty
or fifty years of acceptance and lip service, and to
try a new approach.
We are living in an era of great emphasis upon
civil liberties. We sometimes act as though this
generation wrote the Bill of Rights or had just
recently discovered it. In. our time, the Bill of
Rights has been extensively rewritten by the
Supreme Court and considerably broadened and
expanded in the process. In our general satisfac-
tion with this development, we sometimes tend
to forget that every extension-of the rights of the
individual in the criminal field must necessarily
and proportionately diminish the ability of society
as a whole to protect itself against the criminal.
The very delicate balance between the rights of the
individual and the rights of society is not easily
arrived at. It was the object of very considerable
concern on the part of the architects of the Con-
stitution, who built upon the experience and ac-
cumulated wisdom of Western civilization. I think
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they achieved a very nice balance, and I think we
tinker with it somewhat at our peril. I digress to
point this out because there seems to be a current
assumption that Justice Holmes invented human
rights and that Justices Frankfurter, Douglas,
and Black stand alone bearing the torch of human
freedom.
Before 1900 there was as genuine a concern for
human rights and civi liberties as there is today,
but before 1900 illegally seized evidence was gen-
erally admissible in criminal proceedings in both
- state and federal courts without question and
without qualification. We have a tendency to
look back upon this as a somewhat uncivilized
era. They didn't enjoy the blessings we now have
such as inside plumbing, atom bombs, and auto-
matic elevators. But they were quite a civilized
society with a really genuine concern for civil
rights. I think it might safely be said that in the
overall view, the citizen of the nineteenth century
was far freer from'govemment regimentation and
restraint than any of us in our lifetime may hope
to be. The best legal minds of that era believed
that we should admit all relevant evidence in a
criminal proceeding, and my thesis is that we
should not take their opinion lightly nor turn our
back on it simply because it has become fashionable
to do so over the last forty or fifty years. It was
the belief of that time that the only proper crim-
inal trial was one wherein all relevant evidence,
however obtained, was produced so that justice
would be done. It is at this point I take my first
step in opposition to Professor Paulsen.
I disagree that the criminal trial has any other
function except to determine the applicability of
the criminal law to the particular fact situation
then before the court; in othe*r words, to determine
the guilt or innocence of the individual then
standing before the bar of justice. That is not
only its most important function; it is its only
function.
The obligation to see that justice is done has a
dual aspect. It was as important in 1900 as it is
today, and as generally recognized in 1900 as it is
today, that the innocent be acquitted for the sake
of the rights of the individual. But, in 1900 it was
equally important in the minds of the Court and
legal thinkers generally that the guilty be con-
victed for the sake of the rights of society-the
rights of society to live.secure in their persons and
in their property. Under the view in that time, it
was as unthinkable as it is today that the innocent
be convicted. But we seem to have digressed com-
pletely from the second point of view because it
was very unthinkable then that a guilty man be
turned loose to prey again on society as an object
lesson to- an over zealous policeman. Today this
is considered the enlightened and prudent view.
I emphasize this because I think the sharp differ-
ence of opinion between our modem attitude on
this problem and the attitude of a generation or
two ago should cause us to stop, pause, and reflect
as to whether our view today is as enlightened as
we think it is.
To turn to Wigmore for moral support, I point
to a comment of his on Weeks v. United States,'
which is the foundation stone for the federal
exclusionary rule. Wigmore says,
"But the essential fallacy of Weeks v. United
States and its successors is that it virtually
creates a novel exception where the Fourth
Amendment is involved, to the fundamental
principal that an ilegality in the mode of pro-
curing evidence is no ground for excluding it.
The doctrine of such an exception rests upon a
reverance for the Fourth Amendment so deep
and cogent that its violation will be taken notice
of, at any cost of other justice, and even in the
most indirect way.'u
After citing some cases, Wigmore goes on,
"All this is misguided sentimentality. For the
sake of indirectly and contingently protecting
.the Fourth Amendment, this view appears
indifferent to the direct and immediate result,
viz., of making Justice inefficient, and of coddling
the law-evading classes of the population. It
puts Supreme Courts in the position of assisting
to undermine the foundations of the .very
institutions they are set there to protect. It
regards the over-zealous officer of the law as a
greater danger to the community than the
unpunished murderer, or embezzler, or
panderer."
3
Wigmore was given to strong words, and those
are about as strong as his usually are, but I think
they emphasize his point and mine.
Now, I am as aware, I think, as most, of the
abuses of law enforcement, and I am as con-
cemed as the next man for their correction. But,
I cannot accept the proposition that turning
criminals loose on society by suppressing illegally
J 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENcE §2184, at 36 (1940). (Italics
in the original.)
3 Id. at 36-37.
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seized evidence does adequately solve the problem
of punishing the over zealous and misbehaving
officer. It punishes, in fact, the innocent citizenry.
The officer is not disciplined for the failure to
obtain a conviction. The officer is not disciplined
in our moder society for his illegal search. The
federal exclusionary rule in effect now for nearly
fifty years has not noticeably deterred illegal
searches and seizures which, if the civil liberties
groups are to be believed, are as pressing a prob-
lem today as they ever were. This federal exclu-
sionary rule has been adopted over the years by
about half of the states. There is no indication
that law enforcement in these states has been
imbued with any greater respect for civil liberties
than in the less enlightened half of the Union not
following the rule. There is not the slightest indi-
cation that the Chicago Police Department,
operating under the exclusionary rule adopted by
the State of Illinois, is any more zealous to protect
civil liberties than the New York City Police
Department which does not have such a sanction
or censure hanging over it. It can be debated end-
lessly whether in areas where the exclusionary
rule has been adopted by the state you do have
better law enforcement or better regard by law
enforcement agencies for the rights of individuals,
but, as Professor Paulsen pointed out, so many
other factors are involved that it can never be
definitely stated that the exclusionary rule- has
had any bearing on this.
It should be remembered also that there are
means other than the exclusionary rule for pro-
tecting the Fourth Amendment rights of our
citizens. Admittedly, these do not seem adequate
at the moment. I would suggest, however, that
much of the energy now being given to supporting
the federal exclusionary rule might be directed to
an exploration of the possibilities of strengthening
the remedy of the citizen against the officer vio-
lating the rights. I know of no serious studies
currently going on to consider the problem, and it
is an area which should be explored. I recognize
the futility of giving the individual, the injured
citizen, a civil remedy against an impoverished
policeman where his only remedy must be in
damages. But, I agree with the comment of
Professor Paulsen that one of the considerations
most deserving of attention in this field is that
of shifting the financial responsibility for improper
conduct of policemen, on a respondeat superior
basis, to the municipality or sovereign which
employs them. This would be difficult to achieve,
but it certainly would be worth the effort. Proper
administration of such a system might not be
easy to come by, but again it certainly would be
worth the effort.
If the remedy were against the municipality
and if it were fairly applied by a court, I think the
city might very quickly take steps to educate,
restrain, and deter its police force from illegal
conduct, and I cannot accept the proposition
that this could not be worked out. The redressing
of the rights of an individual by awarding him
damages in a court of law is something so fun-
damental to our system that I don't think it can
be lightly said that in this area or in any other it
cannot be applied to any current problem we
have.
My conclusion then is that Weeks v. United
Ses is a piece of pure judicial legislation and an
attempt to achieve a social goal. I hate to see
the Court legislating to achieve social goals, but it
seems to have become a Supreme Court hobby in
recent years. The Court created an evidentiary
rule to achieve a stated social purpose. I think tho
rule was ill conceived, and the purpose is not being
achieved by it. Another deterrent for illegal
searches and seizures must be found which does
not punish society as a whole for the misconduct
of the individual law enforcement agent.
,. As I mentioned earlier, the federal exclusionary
rule in the forty to fifty years of its existence has
been adopted by only about half of the states.
Apparently it has not been found to be so com-
pletely impressive and overwhelmingly logical
that the forty-eight (or now fifty) states rushed
to accept it. I think it should be abandoned by
those states that now follow it and dropped by
the federal courts as well. The decisions applying
it demonstrate its lack of logic, and I think history
demonstrates its failure. Better ways to enforce
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment against
law enforcement agents can certainly be found,
and I don't think any genuine effort has been
made to develop them. But, far from abandoning
the exclusionary rule, the federal courts and the
United States Supreme Co .L are now moving
swiftly in the opposite direction.
In recognition of the inherent limitations of the
rule, its application has been traditionally hedged
about with some very broad exceptions which
Professor Paulsen has described for you. The chief
of these is the generally recognized and long
!Vol. 52 .
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standing rule that evidence illegally seized by
state officers may be used in the federal courts if
federal agents have not cooperated in the seizure.
This major exception to the exclusionary rule,
which drastically reduced its potential for public
mischief, is apparently about to disappear. Despite
dear-cut and long standing precedent, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia in October, 1958, in Hanna v. United States,4
reversed a federal conviction based upon evidence
illegally seized by state officers in Maryland. This
-state seizure was not a brazen violation of in-
dividual rights but a rather dose question of
whether the officers had acted properly. (I'd
agree with the court in deciding that the officers
did not act properly, but I merely point out that
it was not an outrageous abuse of the officers'
discretion.) The court based its decision on a study
of a progressive series of Supreme Court opinions,
and the conclusion it drew from these opinions
was that the trend of the Supreme Court thinking
was toward eliminating the so-called "silver
platter doctrine." So Judge Hastie hurried to be
the first on the band wagon and beat the Supreme
Court to it. The Seventh Circuit subsequently
considered the same question in United States v.
Camara5 and, unlike the District of Columbia and
in the face of the Hanna decision, they thought it
appropriate to wait for the Supreme Court rather
than to lead the way, so they followed the tradi-
tional rule. But, Judge Hastie's prediction is
probably right, and I think the federal "silver
platter doctrine" is on its way out.6
One final c6mment, however, on an even more
far reaching decision which received far less at-
tention than the Hanna decision, Rea v. United
Staes7 In Rea, a federal officer seized narcotic
evidence, some marijuana, in a search which was
later held to have been improper, and the evidence
was ordered suppressed. A prosecution of the
same individual was undertaken by the state for
the same narcotics violation, and the federal
narcotics agent was subpoenaed to testify for the
state and to produce the evidence he had seized.
In a very extraordinary and to my mind un-
precedented move, the defense went into federal
4260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
'271 F. 2d 787 (7th Cir. 1959).
' Several months after the completion of the Confer-
ence at which this paper was delivered, the Supreme
Court lived up to the advance billing in the Hanna
case and overruled the "silver platter doctrine." See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
7350 U.S. 214 (1956).
court and moved for an order enjoining the federal
narcotics officer from testifying in the state pro-
ceeding or producing his evidence there. His
motion was denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court
enthusiastically embraced the notion that this
federal officer certainly should be enjoined from
playing his ignoble role as a person appearing for
the state to produce the ill-gotten evidence which
he had in his possession. No constitutional question
was involved in this case, the Court said. It was
acting under its general supervisory authority over
federal law enforcement agents. Now, that concept
lies in the case like a time bomb. If the Supreme
Court has had a general supervisory authority
over federal law enforcement agents, it has never
occurred to me to suspect its existence prior to
now. And the Court was so confident that it had
it, it did not bother to explain, give precedent, or
indicate where it got it. This ignoring of the con-
cept of the division of our government into three
separate branches wherein authority of a super-
visory nature over law enforcement agents rests,
as I thought, with the executive branch, leads
me to wonder where the Court is going to go next
in following up this so called supervisory authority
that it has invented for itself. With this simple
phrase and explanation, the Court said that it
would prevent a federal law enforcement agent
from testifying in the state criminal proceedings.
I think that case is probably more startling than
Hanna and -will have, in the course of the next
generation, far-reaching consequences. I do not
rejoice that the Court has adopted this supervisory
role, because I do not agree with the philosophy of
the Court with regard to federal law enforcement
agencies and their tactics.
I think we are living in an era where in the
course of emphasis upon individual civil liberties
the Court has come dangerously close to upsetting
the balance which it is necessary to preserve
between the rights of the individual and the rights
of society as a whole. In tying the hands of our
law enforcement agencies under the philosophy
that a criminal prosecution is sort of a sporting
contest where the odds must be even, we may be
submitting our society to the inroads of a criminal
element which ultimately we will not be able to
control. I am not suggesting as a blood-thirsty
prosecutor that everybody is guilty and they
should be marched to jail without a trial. But, I
do suggest to you that we consider how far we have
strayed from the proposition that the function of
19611
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a trial is to send a guilty man to jail and to acquit
an innocent man. If we disturb that function or
envision the function of a trial to be anything else,
we are stripping the government of the power to
protect us against criminals and crime.
The views I have expressed, I gather, have
been very rarely heard lately, but I commend them
for your serious consideration.
ADDENDUM
In the case of Mapp v. Ohio,8 the United States
Supreme Court had before it a search by local
police officers, dearly illegal by federal standards
but not so in the mind of the Ohio Supreme Court.
8 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
The Court decided to take a new look at the rule of
Wolf v. Colorado,9 "that in a prosecution in a State
Court for a State crime, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not forbid the admission of evidence ob-
tained by an unreasonable search and seizure."
In lengthy opinions, the Justices impatiently
note that the progress of the states in embracing
the exclusionary rule while "inexorable" is also
"halting." Unable to wait, the Court convinces
itself at length that the exclusionary rule is inher-
ent in the Due Process Clause where Wolf had
specifically found it not to be. Thus the last excep-
tion falls. Illegally seized evidence is inadmissible
in all courts, no matter by whom seized.
9 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
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